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The Changing Understanding of the
Making of Europe from Christopher
Dawson to Robert Bartlett
Glenn W. Olsen
University of Utah, Salt Lake City

The Making of Europe, published sixty-one years apart, may help us assess profound shifts that
have taken place in the understanding of Europe over the last twothirds of the twentieth century. Both books were or are by master, if quite
dissimilar, historians.1 Though the books share the same title, profound
differences, perhaps the program of each author, is revealed in their subtitles. For Christopher Dawson (1889–1970), arguably the most eminent
Catholic historian of the twentieth century, The Making of Europe was An
Introduction to the History of European Unity (London, 1932). As a
member of an interwar generation concerned about the fragility and liberal prospects of Europe, Dawson’s special interest was to trace the process
by which Europe had achieved whatever hard-won cultural unity it had.
For Robert Bartlett, The Making of Europe is, in fin-de-siècle language, a
story of Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950–1350 (Princeton, 1993). In the present essay, I would like to compare the understanding of “Europe” in these two books. Part of my argument is that the
difference in the treatment of European identity in the two works closely
tracks changes in the understanding of, and attitudes toward, Europe in
the larger society. In these shifts, the argument also is, we have lost at least
as much in understanding as we have gained.
The differences between the books are most evident in their portrayal
of the role of Christianity in the formation of European identity, and their
consequent understanding of what Europe is. European history, especially
since the Enlightenment, involved a “settling of scores” several times in
the matter of Christianity.2 If the Enlightenment attacked the medieval
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1An earlier form of this article was given as a paper at the V Congreso “Cultura Europea,” held at the University of Navarre, Pamplona, 28–31 October 1998, and is being published in the Actas of that Congress.
2On this and the following paragraphs, see Adriaan Bredero, Christendom and Christianity in the Middle Ages: The Relations between Religion, Church, and Society, trans. Reinder
XXX
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acculturation of Christianity, Romanticism defended it under the banner
of the “Christian Middle Ages.” The work of Christopher Dawson, with
its argument that Christianity was the most central element in the making
of Europe, bears some marks of this latter approach.3 In some respects,
Dawson wrote as an anti-Gibbon, insisting against Gibbon’s obtuseness
that Christianity played a preservative and creative role in the Middle
Ages.4 Dawson was a careful and measured thinker, but he feared the
imminent demise of both Christianity and Europe. Several of his books in
effect express Evelyn Waugh’s thought that when Europe “ceases to be
Christian, it will cease to be.”5 Dawson’s point was that the spread and
history of Christianity had provided the narrative which had formed
Europe, and that taken out of this narrative Europe could hardly be
spoken of as existing.
In contrast, the work of Robert Bartlett, while far from an aggressively
laicist attack on medieval Christianity, does, especially through its use of an
analysis according to categories of power now common in French historiography, bear the mark of profound shifts in historical fashion which,
whatever else they do, in fact continue the “settling of scores.” In Bartlett’s case, this seems largely inadvertent, more found in what is not discussed than in what is. He considers the Church as one more institution,
one more player in the power game, at some length. He hardly describes
the Church as school of sanctity or locus of prayer and adoration, and it
seems clear to me that Bartlett’s chapter on “The Roman Church and the
3

Bruinsma (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Eerdmans, 1994), ix. Cf. especially to Bartlett the
approach taken by J. R. S. Phillips, The Medieval Expansion of Europe, 2d ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999).
3Glenn W. Olsen, “The Maturity of Christian Culture: Some Reflections on the Views
of Christopher Dawson,” in The Dynamic Character of Christian Culture: Essays on Dawsonian Themes, ed. Peter J. Cataldo (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984), 97–
125 at 108–13 and 119, considers Dawson’s retention of elements of a Romantic and Hegelian approach to history. Bredero, Christendom and Christianity, 11, in noting the influence
of Romanticism on the writing of Church history in the first half of the twentieth century,
justly observed “The complexity of social change—now better appreciated by historians due
to the influence of the social sciences—has changed the approach of historians to the relationship between religion, church, and society in the Middle Ages, when compared to that
of their Christian predecessors in the period between the World Wars.”
4Patrick Allitt, Catholic Converts: British and American Intellectuals Turn to Rome (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1997), in a chapter featuring “The Convert Historians,”
gives good characterizations of Dawson’s achievements, and develops the idea of Dawson as
an anti-Gibbon (243 and 253). See also Christina Scott, A Historian and His World: A Life
of Christopher Dawson 1889–1970 (London: Sheed & Ward, 1984).
5Waugh as described by J. A. Gray, “A Voice Crying in the Bewilderedness,” New
Oxford Review 65, no. 7 (July–August 1998): 33–41 at 34. See especially Christopher Dawson, Understanding Europe (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1960), chaps. 10–
13, and The Crisis of Western Education (Steubenville, Ohio: Franciscan University Press,
1989), chaps. 13–15.
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Christian People” is easily the least satisfactory chapter in his book.6 In
this book we encounter the monks as colonizers, drainers of swamps, and
cultivators, but not as liturgical innovators and scholars. The drive behind
European expansion is found in such practices as primogeniture, but
apparently there is no thought to assess the role of Christian reform ideas
such as reformatio in melius, fostered above all from the time of the Gregorian Reform, in encouraging a forward-looking attitude toward time, a
shift in important circles in people’s attitudes toward time.7
The issues may be engaged by summarizing Dawson’s and Bartlett’s
view of how Europe came to be. For Dawson, Europe formed in the early
Middle Ages, especially during the Carolingian period, as a synthesis, an
organic growth, a unity achieved, formed from quite disparate elements.8
Chief among these were the Greek philosophic and scientific tradition,
Roman imperial memory, the social and military customs of northern
Europe, and Christianity.9 Dawson’s idea was that at the center of all culture is religion, that culture is embodied religion or religion given material
and concrete expression. This culture is not specifically “high” culture,
culture in the intellectual historian’s sense, but shared worldviews, “culture” as it was understood by anthropologists in Dawson’s day. Dawson
was one of the first historians to sit at the feet of the anthropologists and
sociologists, and to adopt some of their ways of thinking. Romanticism,
specifically the notion that each civilization develops common ways of
thinking or a common spirit, and the anthropologists’ idea of culture came
together in such of his remarks as that “the essential unity of a civilization
consists in a common consciousness,” and “behind the cultural unity of
6Paul Freedman and Gabrielle M. Spiegel, “Medievalism Old and New: The Rediscovery of Alterity in North American Medieval Studies,” The American Historical Review 103
(1998): 677–704, exhibits a partially overlapping paradox. In the first half of the twentieth
century, many American medievalists approached the Middle Ages in a secular way, being primarily interested in how the Middle Ages had developed rational institutions such as bureaucracy, central government, and universities. In doing so, they emphasized the modernity of
medieval people and tended to be sympathetic to religion, understood as the promoter of
efficiency rather than of superstition. Today, when medievalists arguably give much more
attention to medieval religion, or at least to the less rational aspects of medieval religion, and
analyze things uncongenial to the modern mind such as belief in miracles and visions of
heaven and hell, the Middle Ages is increasingly portrayed as, if not repellent, quite foreign.
7Gerhart Ladner, The Idea of Reform: Its Impact on Christian Thought in the Age of the
Fathers, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1967); eadem, Images and Ideas in the Middle
Ages: Selected Studies in History and Art, 2 vols. (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura,
1983), 2:517–763.
8Cf. the thoughtful views of an American Catholic historian of a later generation, Richard E. Sullivan, “The Carolingian Age: Reflections on Its Place in the History of the Middle
Ages,” Speculum 64 (1989): 267–306.
9Cf. The History of the Idea of Europe, ed. Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen, rev. ed.
(New York: Routledge, 1995), 13, which retains Christendom, with liberty and civilization,
as a (vague) triad defining modern Europe. Cf. Peter Rietbergen, Europe: A Cultural History
(New York: Routledge, 1999).
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every great civilization there lies a spiritual unity.”10 To the extent that a
culture articulates over time a coherent form, this form, Dawson
observed, historically, has been religious. That is, in all historical settings
before our own, religion has tended to permeate and order the various
strands of social life. If many westerners now do not see this, this is
because they have in their own education been given a laicist history from
which religion has been largely excised or portrayed as a dark thing from
which progressive people have struggled to free themselves.
In the Christian Middle Ages, according to Dawson, Christianity
slowly and with much effort became that which gave unity to Europe.
Reviewers at the time of the publication of The Making of the Middle Ages
remarked on how unusual its approach was. In a day when much writing
of history was determined by nationalist allegiances and interests, Dawson
wrote the history of Europe; that is, a history which transcended national
boundaries and refused national prejudices.11 Though he argued that
Christianity was the element which had most shaped European experience, he understood that Europe had been forged from a multitude of
material and spiritual factors, and that in it had existed many overlapping
subcultures. In several of his books he explored some of these, such as the
“‘insular’ Celtic-Anglo-Saxon tradition of vernacular culture,” or the
world of the chanson de geste.12 But his leading idea was that culturally it
was christianitas, a term used as early as the fourth century, that gave
Europe what unity it had. By the end of the eighth century this term carried a meaning which we can translate as “Christendom.” We must
remember, however, that though the Carolingians made Franci virtually
identical with christiani, Dawson’s argument was that the term christianitas had more a cultural than a political force. It referred to shared religion
more than to membership in any specific political entity.13 Though, as we
see in the Song of Roland centuries later, there was for a long time a tendency for each people to identify itself with Christianity, christianitas was
more than any national experience. If it had an institutional expression, it
was in the life of the Church wherever found, for it was the sum total of
Latin Christian experience.
Before Dawson died in 1970, a shift was taking place from speaking of
the “Christian Middle Ages” to speaking simply of “medieval Christian10These two phrases, from Christopher Dawson, “Cycles of Civilization,” in Enquiries
into Religion and Culture (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1933), 70, are quoted in Allitt, Catholic Converts, 255, and see 256 on Dawson’s understanding of culture.
11Allitt, Catholic Converts, 253–54, characterizes this book.
12Christopher Dawson, Medieval Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company,
1959), 151–55.
13Jean Rupp, L’idée de chrétienté dans la pensée pontificale des origines à Innocent III
(Paris: Les Presses modernes, 1939), 13 ff., and Bredero, Christendom and Christianity, 16–
19, give later and in the case of the former, fuller, accounts than that of Dawson.
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ity.” That is, Christianity was increasingly perceived as merely one element
within medieval culture rather than the chief and ordering element. As
interest in the study of “popular religion” grew, for instance, doubts developed as to how “Christian” medieval culture indeed had been, specifically
as to how much documents left by a clerical and monastic elite spoke for
all. Some wrote of two largely disconnected levels of society, a small religious elite at the top, and a mass of people following largely pre-Christian
ways of life summarized in the term “popular religion.”14 Next, with the
growth of “multi-culturalism,” “post-colonialism,” and similar movements, and the increasing portrayal of European history as characterized
by aggressiveness, expansionism, and colonization, but also by cultural
negotiation between colonizer and colonized, a portrayal which has left
deep marks on Robert Bartlett’s book, medieval Christianity was increasingly seen as at heart one more form of “quest for power.” Christianitas
became less something to be studied for itself, in the terms in which it presented and understood itself, and more an “ideology” to be unmasked.
Let me, with the help of a very useful essay by Mark Lilla on “The Politics of Jacques Derrida,” recall a bit of the cultural landscape of the 1970s
and 1980s, especially in France, because this has so profoundly influenced
American historical scholarship and academic attitudes, and thus Bartlett’s
new vision of The Making of Europe (though Bartlett now teaches at St.
Andrew’s, his book was published while he was on the faculty of the University of Chicago). As Lilla points out, as early as the 1950s Claude LéviStrauss, writing during the breakup of the French empire, had attacked
“the defining myth of modern French politics,” namely the idea that the
Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789 expressed universal truths
“which France had been anointed to promulgate to the world.”15 LéviStrauss’s structuralism suggested that the language of universal rights or
values was “a cover for the West’s ethnocentrism, colonialism, and genocide.” His structuralism, on the other hand, “spoke of cultural difference
and the need to respect it....” Lilla observes that the rhetorical gifts LéviStrauss learned from Rousseau “worked an aesthetic transformation on his
readers, who were subtly made to feel ashamed to be European.”
In the 1960s Lévi-Strauss’s writings fed “the suspicion among the
new left that...all the universal ideas to which Europe claimed allegiance—
reason, science, progress, liberal democracy—were culturally specific
weapons fashioned to rob the non-European Other of his difference.…”
14John Van Engen, “The Christian Middle Ages as an Historiographical Problem,” The
American Historical Review 91 (1986): 519–52, summarizes and intelligently attacks such
views. I have further reflections in my “On the Frontiers of Eroticism: The Romanesque
Monastery of San Pedro de Cervatos,” Mediterranean Studies 8 (1999): 89–104.
15“The Politics of Jacques Derrida,” The New York Review of Books [NYRB] 45, no. 11
(25 June 1998): 36-41 at 37. The four following quotations are also from this page.
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In the next decade and to the present, writers such as Jacques Derrida have
continued to promote such ideas, and the result is that there are few educated westerners today who are not at least vaguely aware of the manifold
ways in which Europe has been called before the bar of history.16 More
generally, whether Europe is the historical actor or not, it has become
commonplace to note the ways in which cultural imperialism has taken its
toll around the globe. Events called to one’s attention by the daily newspapers such as the demolition of the Babri Masjid (mosque) in Ayodhya,
Uttar Pradesh, by a mob the year before Bartlett’s book was published,
have drilled the long history of cultural imperialism into Western consciousness. Here a Hindu mob attacked a symbol of sixteenth-century
Islamic conquest, particularly odious to them because constructed from a
Hindu temple which had previously stood on the site.17 An acute observer
could note that what Moslem had done to Hindu was not unlike the
Christian appropriation of spolia, the remains of earlier buildings and cultures, in the Middle Ages. Writers such as V. S. Naipaul gave themselves to
extended critique of such phenomena as Islamic fundamentalism, which
they viewed as a particularly cruel and uncompromising form of imperialism which “strips converted peoples of their past, their sacred places, and
their attachments to their native land.”18 To an almost astonishing degree,
French “postcolonial” thought on such matters has found its way into
American discourse. Thus, though there is no explicit reference to any of
this in Robert Bartlett’s account of The Making of Europe, his book could
not exist without the shifts in the cultural landscape marked by the popularization of such French thinkers as Lévy-Strauss and Derrida.
These remarks made, we can turn to Bartlett and summarize his
understanding of how Europe was made. Perhaps the first thing to be said
is that Bartlett never refers to Dawson. In this sense his book is the ultimate colonization, taking over Dawson’s title and subject without even
ironical acknowledgment. This is not explained by the fact that the books
only partly overlap chronologically, Dawson’s ending about 1100, and
Bartlett’s beginning about 950. Further, there is an important inversion at
work in Bartlett’s book. Dawson never reified Europe in the sense of
making Europe into an historical actor. He understood that European civilization was an amalgam of many interacting forces in which Christianity
had been not just the shaper of cultures, but profoundly influenced and
shaped by the various cultures it encountered. In portraying Europe as a
region which had formed through both peaceful and warlike means, his
16Ibid., 40.
17Pankaj Mishra,

“A New, Nuclear, India?” NYRB 45, no. 11 (25 June 1998): 55–64

at 58.
18Ian Buruma, “In the Empire of Islam,” NYRB 45, no. 12 (16 July 1998): 8–11 at 8,
and see also 10.
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eyes were on the interpenetration of ideas, religion, and habits of life
between colonizer and colonized. However, though he lamented an earlier historiography which gave insufficient attention to what is now called
material culture, Dawson did not consider in detail subjects that have in
the last generation come to dominate economic and social history.19 Thus
though one can get a good idea from his writings of how certain ideas and
practices of the northern cultures influenced Christianity and European
culture, for instance in the institutions of Crusade and knighthood, he did
not pay much attention to the more mundane ways in which the process
of colonization and conquest shaped European culture. Bartlett’s Europe
is formed as much by the process of conquest as it is by any ideas or views
of the world carried by Christianity. Thus, though both men agree that
Europe and European Christianity were profoundly influenced by each of
the cultures they encountered, in the end Bartlett sees this cultural interchange itself, not Christianity, as giving Europe its definition.
In one fascinating chapter after another, Bartlett lays out the ways in
which Europe was formed by a host of factors including the inheritance
patterns of the aristocracy, military technology, agricultural and eating
habits, and the colonization and establishment of new towns and trade.
He traces race relations on the frontiers of Latin Europe, and brings all
these ingredients to a boil in a chapter on “The Europeanization of
Europe.” Here he defines Europeanization as the growing homogenization of Europe in the high Middle Ages from a core “in France, Germany
west of the Elbe and north Italy” (269). The argument in general is much
“closer to the ground” than that of Dawson. Thus while Dawson writes of
the spiritual unity of Europe, Bartlett remarks that “The unity of the
medieval West was, in part, a traders’ unity.”20 Such observations are obviously true, useful, and important, and often may be taken as complementary to Dawson’s approach. But gone is much attention to, say, the Greek
inheritance as an essential element of European civilization, or indeed to
the history of medieval European thought and educational institutions.
Europe is still viewed as “both a region and an idea” (1), and Christianity
has as large a role in Bartlett’s account as in Dawson’s, but more as institution than as idea, sacrament, or theology. Bartlett’s leading idea, that
“Europe was a world of peasant communities” (1), has much greater
prominence in his account than did the peasantry in Dawson’s works.
I have already suggested that in many ways these two books are complementary. Bartlett’s greatly expands our knowledge of all sorts of forces
at work in European life. There are, however, important things lost as we
pass from the one book to the other, and I want to close by a consider19Christopher Dawson, Religion and the Rise of Western Culture (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday & Company, 1958), 12–13.
20Bartlett, Making of Europe, 196.

200

Glenn W. Olsen

ation of these. My argument is not directed against the writing of a new
kind of history. My argument is that important things previously known
fall out of Bartlett’s analysis, not so much by not being present as by not
influencing what is present. This is most obviously so in his chapter on the
Roman Church, which has many flaws. As especially social historians have
replaced the Romantic “hermeneutic of empathy” with an “hermeneutic
of suspicion,” many historians have felt less and less obligated to understand Christianity on its own terms—to have, for instance, an exact knowledge of Scripture, doctrine, and liturgy. They—certainly not all but many
—increasingly have been content to approach Christianity simply as a
structure of power. One irony of this has been that popular culture, formerly portrayed in an undifferentiated manner as hardly worth study in
comparison to Christian high culture, is now studied with great refinement, while Christianity itself has been increasingly marginalized as an
undifferentiated Other.21 This seems to me to occur in Bartlett’s book,
specifically in his chapter on the Roman Church.
In this chapter Bartlett defines Latin Christendom as constituted by
obedience to Rome and a relative uniformity of liturgical practice as determined by Rome. In a book covering the period from 950 to 1350, he
makes no chronological qualifications to such definitions. This seems part
of a tendency to treat the papacy as a rather undifferentiated entity. Presumably in his definition Bartlett has in mind the period of growing papal
ascendancy from the time of Gregory VII (1073–85), but there is no indication that he is aware of, for instance, a scholarship which has increasingly
insisted on the sophistication of early-eleventh-century reform ideas, a
sophistication achieved largely without the papacy. In the words of a book
published after his own, “Before there was a center, there was reform.”22
Although Bartlett’s definition of Christendom is true so far as it goes, his
emphasis on power relations pretty much excludes all else: “Latin Christendom was constituted by the lands and peoples admitting these claims”
(243). From such definitions, one gains little sense of the shared beliefs or
views found in Christendom. A recent review of Ramsay MacMullen’s
lively Christianity and Paganism in the Fourth to Eighth Centuries (New
Haven, 1997), notes an odd thing about this book’s portrayal of the process of Christianization: its “total lack of interest in Christian doctrine.”23
A similar complaint might be lodged against Bartlett. A further result of
his presentation is that the reader is likely to carry away an old stereotype
21Cf. a letter of Brian Tierney to the editor of The American Historical Review 103
(1998): 1758–59 on the dangers of the passion for alterity in current study of the Middle
Ages.
22John Howe, Church Reform and Social Change in Eleventh-Century Italy: Dominic of
Sora and His Patrons (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997), quoted in a
review by Maureen C. Miller, The Catholic Historical Review 84 (1998): 532–34 at 533.
23Averil Cameron, Church History 67 (1998): 567–69 at 569.
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of the high medieval Roman Church as powerful, with little sense of all the
ways Rome was in every century ignored, ineffective, and thwarted by
national governments. From a book which talks about primogeniture
much, but, for instance, the history of marriage little, it is difficult to
obtain a clear idea of how difficult the Church found it actually to get
assent to its ideas.
Again, without anywhere in the book giving an adequate account
going beyond questions of power in the issues between the Gregorian
papacy and Henry IV of Germany, Bartlett describes a letter of 1073 from
Gregory VII to Rudolf of Swabia as a “sinister expression of goodwill”
(245) toward Henry. Then, seriously misunderstanding the attempts of
Gregory and some of his successors to have the papal office recognized as
superior in principle to those of secular rulers, Bartlett tells us that “one
aspect of his programme was the assertion that large parts of the Christian
world were actually the property of the saint [Peter] and his earthly representative, the pope” (248). Without an explanation of historical context,
such statements can only seriously mislead. No eleventh-century pope
attempted to rule Hungary, Dalmatia, Spain, or any other kingdom. What
the popes wanted was “fealty to St. Peter,” an idea coming from the world
of feudalism. Just as a feudal overlord was not to usurp the rights of his
vassals or rule in their stead, but wished acknowledgment from them of
their fidelity, their readiness to respond to his initiatives, so the pope used
the ideas of papal propietorship and fealty to St. Peter to speak of duties
owed the papacy or tasks incumbent on all Christendom, things like raising or paying for the troops against Henry, or later responding to the call
to crusade. Such ideas urged the view that the papacy had primary responsibility for Christendom and for the spiritual life of Christians, and
attempted to obtain from lay rulers acknowledgment of the papal office as
in this goal intrinsically higher than lay offices, to which were given concern for human temporal flourishing. These ideas stand in the long Gelasian tradition of distinguishing between the spheres of king and priest
while insisting on the final superiority of the priestly authority.
Dawson’s view that the unity of Europe was spiritual led him to
employ the title “The Rise of the Mediaeval Unity” for a chapter of The
Making of Europe that begins with the demise of the Carolingians and
ends with “the new order which arose in the West in the eleventh century”
(219). After the destruction by the Vikings of the political unity the Carolingians had begun to give Europe, the reforming Church had for the
most part to begin from the ground up in the eleventh century. What
Dawson saw as so central to this second struggle for European unification
was that it was essentially a work of the reformed papacy. It was not that
the goal of the papacy was the unification of Europe; rather, this was the
result or an offshoot of the papacy working for a more effective assimila-
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tion of Christianity. Bartlett would not quarrel with seeing the eleventhcentury initiatives of the papacy as central to European unification. This
said, his book conveys little of the sense in which, going beyond issues of
power, this unification was a work of the spirit. It was not the creation of
a temporal regime but the insinuation of Christianity into more areas of
life than it had claimed in the early Middle Ages.
An irony is that, by talking so little about the Church’s interior life,
Bartlett misses some of his best opportunities for showing Rome engaged
in a power game. He never alludes, for instance, to André Vauchez’s
impressive 1981 detailing of the process by which, by increasingly taking
charge of and defining canonization, Rome tried to control the definition
of sanctity.24 In similar manner, a section on “The Crusades” in the same
chapter on the Roman Church never introduces a body of scholarship that
has called the very existence of the “Crusades” into question. This scholarship sees in this term “Crusades” a modern anachronistic linking and
numbering of various forms of what initially was called armed pilgrimage.25 From his first mention of them, the Crusades are for Bartlett “wars
of Christian expansion” (13), one of the best examples of European colonialism. He seems completely unaware of scholarship that, beginning from
the fact that “until the 1700s there was a desperate struggle between
Christendom and Islam,” now draws an analogy coming from the late
1980s, the struggle of John Paul II to overthrow communism, “to
remind ... Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians that the church had not
forgotten them.”26 Here the Crusades are placed in the context of clash
between cultures and struggle for human minds, and seen as involving
much more than colonialism and economic expansion. Scholars have
begun to reflect on the fact that one was more likely to lose than to gain
money from going on crusade, and that no European institution, papal or
royal, was capable of protecting by force commerce, tourism, or pilgrim-

24André Vauchez, Sainthood in the Later Middle Ages, trans. Jean Birrell (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1997).
25Elizabeth Siberry, Criticism of Crusading 1095–1274 (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1985), vii, notes that in the period covered by her book there was no specific terminology of crusade. Of the articles “Confronting the Crusades” edited by Nigel Saul in the
March and April 1997 issues of History Today 47, see esp. “The Pilgrim Origins of the First
Crusade,” by Marcus Bull, March, pp. 10–15. Even after a century of crusading, what we call
the “Fourth Crusade” was still simply called an “expedition,” and no numbering of “armed
pilgrimages” and “expeditions” into a continuing series of “Crusades” had taken place. See
Jonathan Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the Idea of Crusading (Philadelphia, University
of Pennsylvania Press, 1986).
26William Urban, “Rethinking the Crusades,” Perspectives: American Historical Association Newsletter 36, no. 7 (Oct. 1998): 25–29 at 26–27. Cf. Aleksander Gieysztor, “Le
mythe de croisade,” in L’Europe dans son histoire: La vision d’Alphonse Dupront, ed. François
Crouzet and François Furet, foreword by Pierre Chaunu (Paris: Presses universitaires de
France, 1998).
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age in the Holy Land.27 But to introduce such scholarship would be to
introduce the medievals’ own way of understanding themselves as more
than creatures in power relationships, as more varied than Bartlett presents
them. In sum, great achievement as it is, Bartlett’s book, by embodying a
partiality of perspective now common in the writing of social history and
by the loss of empathy, flattens out all those things which were most differentiated in Dawson.

27Ibid., 29, and Jonathan Riley-Smith, “Early Crusaders to the East and the Costs of
Crusading, 1095–1130,” in Cross Cultural Convergences in the Crusader Period: Essays Presented to Areyh Grabois on His Sixty-Fifth Birthday, ed. Michael Goodich, Sophia Menache,
and Sylvia Schein (New York: P. Lang, 1995).

